Our investigation has uncovered a complex network of over 260 companies, revealing an intricate web of interconnected entities through layered holding structures. Notably, our findings have also highlighted employees within this network having their employer changed from one company to another, within the same network. This has sparked significant interest, as it provides valuable insight into the inner workings and organizational structure of the network.

According to Africa Intelligence, following sanctions against 2Rivers DMCC and 2Rivers PTE in December 2024, 2Rivers transferred its activites to a new entity, Safira Global Trading. 2Rivers aren't the only ones transferring their business; we were also told that similarly LME Trading DMCC, previously LITASCO Middle East (trading unit of Russian oil giant LUKOIL), transferred its business activities to Alghaf Marine DMCC in2025. The move may have been a preemptive measure, as Bloomberg reported rumors of potential EU sanctions targeting LME Trading DMCC.

But let's bring our focus back to Eyyub and Garayev; there is little more to find on Safira Global Trading, however as seen in our previous articles, Saphira Energy FRZE is part of this network, and given what we've found below, it is possible Africa Intelligence simply had the wrong spelling.

Information shared with us shows the important companies within the Eyyub and Garayev network; Alraso Freight and Logistics DMCC (previously known as DNA Shipping DMCC) and Saphira Energy FZE, with several others appearing as employers under these two companies. Their Moscow operations branch includes companies such as Omega Energy LLC and Global Services Group LLC.

Sergey Dobrinov, an individual in upper management in Garayev and Eyyub's network that features in our previous reporting, has been identified as the owner of Omega Energy.

Omega Energy has a website, omega-energy.ru, where it presents itself as a prominent supplier of petrochemical products and claims to be an official distributor for Rosneft. This raises the possibility that Eyyub and Garayev may be relying on other senior staff members within the network to facilitate their operations. The rest of the Moscow office remains somewhat of a mystery.

Alraso Freight and Logistics DMCC has an interesting presence in terms of office locations (perhaps these are key hubs for the network), as well as what its own subnetwork of companies that are used to represent the staff's employers. It's also interesting that unlike Saphira Energy FZE, it has a presence in Moscow. Whilst we were unable to find out more about Alraso Freight and Logistics DMCC/DNA Shipping DMCC in our research, Adele Shipping and Freight DMCC has a somewhat basic website (adeleshipping.com) with very generic stock photos and little personal information about the individuals behind the operations of this company. Perhaps fitting for a front company.

Shanghai Office

What really ties this all together is Shanghai. According to information we have received, employees in reportedly the same office in Shanghai are employed by 2Rivers DMCC, Shanghai Energy Resources Co Ltd (which fall under the shipping arm of the network) and Saphira Energy's Shanghai office. This raises questions about the legitimacy of 2Rivers executives' claims that their operations are separate, given the apparent co-location of these entities.

The office in Shanghai we are told is becoming the financial hub for the network, facilitating 10s of billions of dollars of payments for the network. As Western banks sever ties with the network due to sanctions, it's likely that China is becoming an increasingly vital component of their operations.

It's not surprising that China and Russia are working together, they've done it before. But this may mean Western countries need to consider China in a similar manner to India. They are facilitating and likely profiting from trading Russian oil, but are not facing sanctions. The US placed tariffs on India for refining the oil, but is that an option here? Should more scrutiny be placed on oil coming from them? China has the potential to obscure Russia's oil trading even more. It's certain that if sanctions are to be fully effective, this problem needs a solution.