We have received the identities of a large number of companies, which are apparently part of Eyyub and Garayev's oil trading scheme. We have analyzed these, and have found concrete indications that the following at least are indeed part of the network. We will show the evidence that leads to this conclusion in other articles. 

The companies that we are confident are part of the network are:

Aclotte Logistics FZE

Al-Hawa Networks FZE

Allegro Development Limited 

Alpha Trade FZE 

Alroy Holdings Limited

Al-Tasameem Group FZE

Arctos Shipping and Trade

Ardes Integrated FZE

Arrada Energy FZE

Arthemis Services FZE

Astra East Navigation FZE

Augusta Commodity

Balmo Trading FZE

Bevon Integrated FZE

Birchwood Resources

Castleton Corporation FZE

Clover Solutions FZE

Colwich Continental FZE

Disentis Trading Limited / LLC

EastImpex Stream FZE

EcoMatrix Oil and Commodity FZE

Engelberg Holding Limited

Ethos Dynamics FZE

Fadas Trade FZE 

Ferrat Navigation FZE

Foucher Trade Limited FZE

Foxton FZCO

Fuel and Oil Dynamics

FusionFlux Energy

Guron Trading Limited

Helvetic Navigation FZE

Heptagon International

Heston Agency FZE

Jinao Corporate FZE

Kashmani Logistics FZE

Keystone Holding FZE

Levian Industries FZE

Lumira Cpaital Limited FZE

Mosiac Partners FZE

Marimex Trade FZE

Navratan Ventures FZE

Nawaem Logistics FZE

Newton Resources FZE

Nookspot Services FZE

OilPeak Products FZE

Omni Marine & Transport

Ossydey Integrated FZE

PrimeGrowth FZE

RafflonLine FZE

Rockwell Energy FZE

RR Aliance FZE

Scaffollo Globe FZE

Sentura Global FZE

Shreevaani Exom FZE

Sierra Holding Limited

SilverArc Logistics FZE

Skyion Solutions FZE

Societe Galatea FZE

Tanzhouli Integrated FZE

TetraWaters FZE

Totcor Trade FZE

Tradestream FZE

Vault Energy Resources DMCC

Wissol Commodities FZCO

Zenith Global Corporation Limited

Zenrock Holding Limited

Zheshang Resources FZE

Zion Trade Limited

**Other probable entities**
Whilst the list above shows those companies for which we can find corroborating evidence, there have been other entities highlighted to us for which we cannot show definitive evidence of their connection to the network. Nevertheless, as these were included amongst those which we have been able to independently confirm, it seems reasonable to conclude that they are also feasibly part of the network. With that in mind, we have decide to also list these entities, albeit with the the caveat that they are, as yet, unproven. We will continue to investigate them further, and would welcome any further information should it be provided to us. 

Adele Shipping and Freight DMCC

Alraso Shipping and Freight

DNA Shipping DMCC

Dover Commodity Limited 

Efori DMCC

Levitt Commodity Corporation FZE

Marsolut Management DMCC

MidPoint Trading Limited

Mrimex Trans FZE

Nexus Marine DMCC

Omega Energy LLC

Oryx QA FZCO

Petromax FZCO

Poly Pro Trading DMCC

ProlLink Management Pte Ltd

Valorup Continental Energi Limited Sikreti

VIvaVista Trading DMCC

Windstream DMCC




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List of current suspect Shadow Fleet companies

Eyyub and Garayev Connected Companies

#### A Labyrinth of Front Companies and Deceit

**Uncovering a Vast Network of Front Companies**
In our previous article, we exposed over 50 companies suspected of being part of an oil trading network controlled by Etibar Eyyub and Tahir Garayev. Clearly we aren't alone in our interest in these companies, other journalists have called out instances of duplicity and it seems the authorities are taking notice. The USA, Europe and UK have issued sanctions, and according to reports, more are to follow should Russia continue its aggression in Ukraine. For example, according to the Wall Street Journal, the UK's latest sanctions package would target "Eyyub, his business partner Tahir Garayev and three associates", which proved to be the case. 

It is clear that many other people have been following the actions of these companies and several individuals have approached us with additional information, providing us with a list of new companies they believe are also involved. 

**Unraveling the Web**
Looking into these newly identified entities, we found evidence they were part of a large network of front companies, all likely controlled by Eyyub and Garayev. The companies on the list were diverse, with different names, addresses, and apparent business activities. However, as we dug deeper, we began to see a web of connections between the companies that suggested they were indeed part of a larger, coordinated operation. 

We discovered numerous connections between the new companies and those we previously identified. Many of these companies are registered in the UAE and there are many other commonalities that you can see, the closer you look. Here are some examples:

- **Shared Ultimate Beneficial Owners (UBOs)**: We discovered that several companies on the new list shared the same UBOs as companies we previously identified. For example, Bilal Aliyev an Azerbaijani national is the UBO of US and UK sanctioned BX Energy (previously the subject of one of our articles, under the name Bellatrix Energy), as well as several other companies, including Allegro Development Limited, Foxton FZCO, and Disentis Trading Limited. This suggests that these companies are all part of a larger, coordinated operation. 

- **Common directors**: We found that some companies on the new list shared the same directors as companies we previously identified. For example, Abdulla Feruzabonu is a director of both Disentis Trading Limited and Zenroc Holding Limited, indicating a connection between these companies. 

- **Incorporation patterns**: We noticed that several companies on the new list were incorporated on the same day, suggesting a coordinated effort to set up new entities. For example, Al-Tasmeem Group FZE, Birchwood Resources, and Shreevaani Exim FZE were all incorporated on November 28, 2024, and share the same UBO, Blakhatov Islombek, an Uzbekistani national, who is also the director of Foxton FZCO mentioned above. 

- **Interconnected ownership structures**: We found some companies on the new list had complex ownership structures that were interconnected with other companies on the list. For example, Alroy Oldings Limited is the parent company of Foxton FZCO and Zenith Global Corporation Limited, both of which are connected to BIlal Aliyev.

We are working through all these connections and as we find out more, we will publish articles that explain just how these companies are connected. The links between companies suggest that Eyyub and Garayev's network is much larger and more complex than initially thought. The use of front companies, shared ownership structures and coordinated incorporation dates all point to a highly organized and sophisticated operation designed to evade sanctions and manipulate the international financial system.

The list of new companies identified as part of Eyyub and Garayev's network is available in the article linked to this one, and will be maintained and expanded as more information comes to light. This list may be of interest to anyone who wants to understand the scope and complexity of these operations and anyone who wants to see just how these individuals are evading global sanctions. By making this information publicly available, we hope to contribute to a greater understanding of the global oil trade and the networks that operate within it. We believe that we must shed a light on the illegal financial flows that are continuing to finance Russia's war in Ukraine. We encourage others to join us in shedding light on this critical issue and if you have relevant information, please get in touch. 

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New companies believed to be in Shadow Fleet

Eyyub and Garayev's Oil Empire

In the wake of international sanctions against Russia, a clandestine fleet of oil tankers has emerged, secretly transporting millions of barrels of Russian crude and fueling the Kremlin's war machine. Known as the "Shadow Fleet," this mysterious armada has been operating in the shadows, exploiting loopholes and weaknesses in the global regulatory system. Our investigation lifts the lid on the Shadow Fleet's inner workings, revealing a complex web of shell companies, proxy owners and clandestine transactions that threaten to undermine the global economy.

As sanctions continue to make life awkward for the Russian economy, after their illegal war in Ukraine, traditional industries are struggling to support the state to the level that is needed to keep the fight going. Industries such as energy, and in particular oil have been targeted by those who wish to support Ukraine. There has been a lot of analysis on the impact of these sanctions, particularly how it has impacted traditional players in this industry; Lukoil, Gazprom Neft and Rosneft.

Much less analysis has been published online however, that looks at what Russia has done subsequently. In order to keep the cash coming in and to keep funding the war, Russia has turned to the Shadow Fleet. The Shadow Fleet are a number of vessels that are being used to obfuscate the Kremlin's control over the oil that they are transporting across the globe.

To read our other articles that dive deeper into Russia avoiding sanctions, [click here](https://whereisrussia.today/feed/tag/sanctions).

Russia uses a number of holding companies to make investigating ownership more challenging. Let's have a look at one of the vessels being used and how it has changed hands over the last 2.5 years.

## Vladimir Arsenyev
The Vladimir Arsenyev (IMO 9901025) is a 3-year-old vessel that has been put to work moving shady Russian oil, since it's construction in March 2022. It has been used to transport oil from De Kastri in Russia to South Korea, China and India. In the 3 years since it's build date, our data shows that it has been registered to 5 different companies. These are Bellatrix Energy Limited (17 Nov 22 - 2 Mar 23), Volition DMCC (21 Apr 23), Ultimate Sprint Limited (27 Jun 23 - 2 Sep 24), Glenbrook Corporation Limited (3 May 24 - 4 Dec 24)and Marion Commodity DMCC.

Reports have also shown the Vladimir Arsenyev has transferred oil to other Russian ships (the Danban (IMO 9294331)). The transfer took place in Nakhoda Bay. These transfers are oft used to hide a cargo's origin. The Danban was chosen as it has so far avoided sanctions. The Danban then went on to the port of Qingdao in China. 

The Vladimir Arsenyev currently sails under the flag of Comoros but has also sailed under the flags of Panama and Cyprus in the past.

The United States imposed sanctions on the Vessel on 10 Jan 25. The aim of these sanctions is to increase the difficulty countries face when trying to do business with this ship. The Vladimir Arsenyev joins a list of 183 vessels sanctioned by the USA. Sanctions have also been applied to Ingosstrakh Insurance Company, who have previously provided insurance services to the Vladimir Arsenyev. These sanctions target the tankers responsible for 42% of Russia's seaborne oil exports.

As of 14 May 25, the vessel is off the coast of Russia, near De Kastri.

It's sister vessel is Nikolay Zardonov.

## Nikolay Zardonov
The Nikolay Zardonov is another one of the vessels that Russia is using to transport oil. It too has been owned by several companies; Bellatrix Energy Limited, Volition DMCC, Ultimate Spirit Limited and Glenbrook Corporation Limited. 

It is currently flying under the flag of Barbados. 

As of 10 May 25, the vessel is located off the coast of Russia, near Nakhondka.

## Further Info
According to equasis.org, the Vladimir Arsenyev is owned by Stream Ship Management. The UAE based company was set up in 2023. It received tankers from SCF, a previous owner of Vladimir Arsenyev. The UK already sanctions 10 vessels managed by Stream Ship Management. Stream Ship Management is also sanctioned by the USA.

## Conclusion
The revelations surrounding Russia's Shadow Fleet expose a complex and clandestine network of vessels, shell companies, and proxy owners that have allowed the Kremlin to circumvent international sanctions and continue to fuel its war machine. The Vladimir Arsenyev and Nikolay Zardonov, two vessels highlighted by the investigation, demonstrate the sophisticated tactics employed by Russia to obscure it's control over the oil trade.

As the international community continues to grapple with the implications of Russia's illegal war in Ukraine, the Shadow Fleet poses a significant threat to the global economy and the integrity of the sanctions regime. The fact that these vessels have been able to operate with relative impunity, exploiting loopholes and weaknesses in the global regulatory system, is a stark reminder of the challenges that lie ahead.

The imposition of sanctions on the Vladimir Arsenyev and other vessels, as well as on companies like Ingosstrakh Insurance Company and Stream Ship Management, is a crucial step in disrupting Russia's ability to evade sanctions. However, it is clear that more needs to be done to prevent the Shadow Fleet from continuing to operate.

The consequences of inaction are dire. If Russia is allowed to continue to exploit the global oil trade, it will not only undermine the effectiveness of sanctions but also embolden other rogue actors to follow suit. The global economy will suffer as a result, and the rules-based international order will be further eroded. 

The stakes are clear: either the international community takes decisive action to dismantle the Shadow Fleet and hold the responsible accountable, or it risks allowing Russia to continue to flout international law and undermine global stability. The choice is stark and the consequences of inaction will be severe. 

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Looking at the ships used by Russia to evade sanctions.

How Putin's Regime Continues Sanction Evasion

Data reveals that the European Union, a vocal ally of Ukraine and a key enforcer of sanctions against Russia, has been inadvertently facilitating Russia's sanction-evading actions. An analysis of a leaked spreadsheet, purportedly containing insurance records of the Shadow Fleet, has revealed the fleet has traveled to the heart of Europe.

According to the data, several EU nations including Greece, Italy, Belgium, Germany, France, and Poland, have been receiving Russian oil shipments, despite the EU's public stance against Russian aggression. The spreadsheet, which appears to be authentic, details the volume of shipments to various ports across Europe:

![Screenshot from 2025-05-08 14-09-52.png](/uploads/Screenshot_from_2025_05_08_14_09_52_f17315ae37.png)

Further investigation has identified two key companies behind European shipments: Hong Kong based Bellatrix Energy and Blackford Corporation Ltd. Bellatrix Energy has been trading tens of millions of tons or Russian crude oil and has secured substantial loans from Russian state-owned banks. The US Department of the Treasury sanctioned Bellatrix Energy in December 2023 for its involvement in the Russian oil trade.

Blackford Corporation, on the other hand, has managed to evade sanctions so far. However, an investigation be Le Monde exposed the company's operations within a network of shell companies, sourcing naphtha from Russian entities and transporting it globally using a fleet of aging vessels, some with transponders turned off.

The revelation raises serious questions over what more the EU can do to honor its commitment to enforcing sanctions against Russia. As the international community continues to grapple with the complexities of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, this highlights the need for greater transparency and accountability in the global oil trade.

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European countries need to do more to enforce oil sanctions

Sanctions evasion in the heart of Europe

### More Companies and Vessels of the Shadow Fleet Emerge

We previously posted articles about the role of Etibar Eyyub and Bellatrix Energy Limited in the Russian Shadow Fleet and asked others to share anything else they knew about the companies involved to keep building the network.

Since that request, we've received a spreadsheet on BlueSky. We have not verified the source yet (if anyone else can verify the content, please do), but a brief read and some research shows it contains a lot of companies and vessels already sanctioned as Shadow Fleet. More interestingly it contains some that AREN'T sanctioned yet.

The data shows details of companies insured by Russian insurance provider Ingosstrakh Insurance Company and AlfaStrakhovanie PLC (already sanctioned), and China registered PICC Property and Casualty Company Limited Nanjing Branch. These are dated from Summer 2022 to early Autumn 2024. The majority of products being insured appear to have been loaded in Russia and are oil related.

In 2022, according to this data, Bellatrix Energy Limited was seemingly the primary company insured for the shipment of oil products, with Everest Energy DMCC, Icdas Celik Enerji Tersane Ve Ulasim A S, Nayara Energy Limited and Petrokim Trading Middle East And Asia DMCC also appearing.

Moving into 2023, Bellatrix still dominates the trades, closely followed by Voliton DMCC. Other companies that begin to emerge in 2023 are:
- Atlas Trading International FZCO
- Blackford Corporation Limited
- Coral Energy DMCC
- Disentis Trading L.L.C-FZ
- Foxton FZCO
- Guron Trading Limited
- Pontus Trading DMCC
- Shanghai Energy Resources Co Ltd
- Ultimate Spirit Limited
- World Trading Corporation Limited

According to the Insider, some of these are connected to the network run by Tahir Garayev and Etibar Eyyub. In December 2023, OFAC sanctioned Hong Kong registered Bellatrix Energy Limited and Voliton DMCC, which creates an interesting data point in the spreadsheet. Soon after the US sanctions, the number of companies utilized for the trade of Russian oil dramatically expands to include:
- Ace Commodity Limited FZE
- Aclotte Logistics FZE
- Allegro Development Limited
- Alphatrade FZE
- Apexis Energy FZE
- Arctos Shipping & Trade DMCC
- Arrada Energy FZE
- Augusta Commodity Enterprise FZE
- Balmo Trading FZE
- EastImplex Stream FZE
- EcoMatrix Oil and Commodity FZE
- Fadas Trade FZE
- Fuel and Oil Dynamics FZE
- FusionFlux Energy FZE
- Glenbrook Corporation Limited
- Global Fertilizers Limited
- Grandall Continental FZE
- Hinera Trading Fzco
- Marinex Limited
- Marion Commodity DMCC
- Newton Resources FZE
- Oxel Solutions FZE
- Pacific Waters DMCC
- Rockwell Energy FZE
- RR Alliance FZE
- Rubus FZE
- Skyion Solutions FZE
- Sns Commodities Dmcc
- Square Energy DMCC
- Teton Global Trading Limited
- TetraWaters FZE
- Totcor Trade FZE
- Tradestream Global FZE
- Valorup Continental FZE
- Vertex Enterprise Limited
- Wissol Commodities Fzco
- Zion Trade Limited FZE

A number of these companies are not new to us, some are included on existing sanctions lists. Many of the vessels listed are sanctioned by either the US, EU or UK although plenty are not. However, this spreadsheet shows how vessels in the network are moving from sanctioned to non-sanctioned company, which suggests many of the new names should also be investigated as part of Russia's Shadow Fleet and considered for sanctions.

We will continue to delve into this data, to see what else we can uncover. We invite our readers to do the same and help us keep building a picture of this network. As the spreadsheet we're exploring only has data up to Autumn 2024, we suspect the list of companies has grown even further and there may be hundreds now involved. This could mean Russia is still making massive profits to fund their war in Ukraine. If between us we can expose more of the network, Russia will find it much harder to hide its covert oil trades. Anyone buying oil from these traders and vessels will know they must apply sanction price caps and Russia's profits to fund the war will drop.

If you want to explore this data with us, here it is: https://1drv.ms/x/s!AuhDOOmO0AwrcNxXCmYvP7FpMK4?e=5ccLG1

Short analysis of data from new spreadsheet of Russia's Shadow Fleet

The Network Grows

For decades, Russia's oil industry has been led by powerhouse commodity traders such as Trafigura. These giants have long been the face of Russia's energy sector, with their operations and dealings largely transparent and subject to international scrutiny. However, in response to Western sanctions, new and mysterious players have emerged on the scene. Comprising a complex network of opaque shell companies operating aging tankers, dubbed the Shadow Fleet, these shady companies have dramatically altered the landscape of Russia's oil exports, allowing the country to circumvent international sanctions and maintain its grip on the global energy market. With the traditional big traders no longer the sole players, the rise of the Shadow Fleet and the companies operating the ships has introduced a new era of complexity and secrecy to Russia's oil industry, making it increasingly difficult to track the flow of oil and the parties involved. As the Shadow Fleet continues to grow in influence, it raises important questions about the true extent of Russia's oil exports, the identities of the companies and individuals behind the Shadow Fleet, and the implications for global energy security and sanctions enforcement. In this article, we will delve into the world of Russia's Shadow Fleet, exploring its origins, operations, and impact on the global energy landscape.

![Companies linked to Etibar Eyyub](/uploads/Screenshot_from_2025_04_17_11_30_53_fd84d9fc01.png)

## Nord Axis
Nord Axis was incorporated in Hong Kong just nine days before Russia's invasion of Ukraine and benefits from being owned by a UAE holding company, ensuring that no stakeholder records are publicly available. Emerging from obscurity, the company seamlessly filled the gap created by Trafigura's exit from the Russian oil market. By acquiring a 10% share in Russian oil company Rosneft's Vostok oil project, Nord Axis commenced exporting large amounts of Rosneft petroleum to international markets. By 2023, using an aging fleet of tankers, the company was exporting billions of dollars worth of Russian crude oil and fuel to Indian and Chinese markets.

## Coral Energy
Sanctioned oil trading company 2Rivers, formerly known as Coral Energy, is based in Dubai and engages in the sale and export of Russian crude oil and petroleum products. The company was founded in 2010 by Tahir Garayev, a seasoned entrepreneur with dual citizenship in Malta and Russia, as well as Azerbaijani roots, and a close friend of Igor Sechin and Rosneft.

Initially, the company focused on trading crude oil from Azerbaijan's state-owned oil company. A pivotal moment came in 2014 when Garayev brought Etibar Eyyub on board to expand Coral's operations in Russia. That same year, the company set up a formal presence in Dubai. As Coral Energy continued to grow, it attracted two additional Azerbaijani nationals, Talat Safarov and Ahmed Karimov, who joined the team over the next few years. Despite closing its Azerbaijan office in 2017, Coral's business was thriving, with revenues soaring to over $3.5 billion by 2018.

According to available information, 2Rivers has become the largest trader evading Western oil sanctions. Eyyub and Garayev operate using a network of obscure companies controlled by the 2Rivers executive team, including ship management and operations companies, and dozens of trading companies registered in the UAE DMCC free zone and Hong Kong. Coral Energy was one of the major traders that emerged following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, along with Everest Energy, which has since claimed to have exited the business. Both companies denied that they left the trade due to sanctions risks. Everest stated, "it was a strategic business decision based on various factors specific to our company." Coral Energy stated, "we made a decision to source outside of Russia thanks to our diversified footprint in the MENA region."

The traders behind Coral Energy live a life of opulence, with many of them being associates. They frequently travel by private jet and divide their time between the affluent suburbs of Geneva and the luxurious skyscrapers of Dubai.

## Sanctions
Coral Energy has come under the scrutiny of international authorities, including the US Office of Foreign Assets Control. Coral Energy and five of its affiliated companies are being investigated by the authority for allegedly selling Russian oil in violation of sanctions. The company's recent rebranding from Coral Energy to 2Rivers has not gone unnoticed. On December 17, the UK announced sanctions against 2Rivers, stating that the move aims to "further drain Putin's war chest" by limiting the oil revenues that fund Russia's ongoing conflict. In response to the sanctions, a spokesperson for 2Rivers told The Wall Street Journal that the company's name was being used without permission by former employees in Russia. The spokesperson also stated that 2Rivers would challenge the sanctions.

## An Aging Fleet
Coral Energy's rapid expansion of its clandestine fleet was fueled by a series of strategic acquisitions, as the company purchased allegedly 125 aging tankers from China, Turkey, and Greece, many of which were built in the early 2000s. Although these vessels may be nearing the end of their lifespan, they come with a hefty price tag, typically ranging from $30 million to $40 million per ship. The use of outdated vessels poses a significant safety risk, as many of these ships are no longer eligible for insurance coverage, leaving them more prone to accidents. According to reports, Coral's purchasing spree was largely facilitated by loans from Russian financial institutions. In an apparent bid to maintain a low profile, the company registered its new acquisitions under the flags of countries with notoriously lax maritime regulations, such as Gabon, Panama, Palau, and the Cook Islands, making it increasingly difficult to track their movements. Reportedly, 47 Coral Energy vessels are currently flying the Gabonese flag.

In a notable transaction, Coral spent €100 million on fuel oil from Petrokim Trading Middle East and Asia DMCC, a Dubai-based entity with ties to Rosneft that has since rebranded as Voliton, between October and November 2022. Interestingly, Petrokim has also been linked to Nayara, an Indian petroleum company in which the Russian energy giant Rosneft holds a nearly 50% stake, highlighting the complex web of connections within the industry.

## Price Cap
The stakes escalated dramatically in December 2022, when a price cap on Russian crude oil imposed by the G7 nations and their allies took effect. The move was designed to limit Moscow's ability to profit from its oil exports, but it appears to have had little deterrent effect on some players in the industry. Documents reveal that Petrokim inked a deal with Nayara, to purchase crude oil at a price of over $67 a barrel - a clear breach of the $60 per barrel cap.

Further investigation suggests that Coral Energy has been finding ways to circumvent the price cap by partnering with ship management companies and vessel owners in countries that have not signed on to the G7 agreement. India and Turkey have emerged as key hubs for these activities, with the Marshall Islands also playing a role. Shipping data shows Coral Energy chartered vessels exporting oil to ports in China, India, and West Africa with impunity.

## Shadowy Transactions
Financial records uncovered a complex web of transactions between Coral Energy and its affiliated companies. In January 2023, Coral Energy requested a refund of €313 million from Petrokim, also known as Voliton, which is linked to Coral Energy. Just a few months later, another Coral Energy affiliate, Pontus Trading, paid $300 million to Voliton. Both companies are registered at the same address in Dubai's Jumeirah Lakes Tower.

Further investigations revealed the creation of a new shell company, Pura Vida Holding Limited, which was incorporated in the United Arab Emirates in May 2023. Pura Vida is listed as the ultimate parent company of Coral and its affiliates. The company's shareholders include two existing Coral Energy affiliates, Talat Safarov and Ahmad Karimov, as well as Anar Madatli, the son of Azerbaijan's former ambassador to Ukraine and the brother-in-law of Coral Energy's founder, Tahir Garayev.

## Further Sanctions
The US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on two entities linked to Coral Energy, Voliton DMCC and Bellatrix Energy Limited, in December. According to the Treasury, Bellatrix "sharply increased its share of the trade of Russian oil since the price cap policy was implemented." Shipping data shows that Bellatrix chartered 13 journeys in 2023, carrying over 3.7 million tons of crude oil or gas oil diesel. The journeys originated from Russian ports, including Primorsk, Tuapse, and Ust Luga, and were destined for ports in India, Greece, Ghana, China, Saudi Arabia, and Benin. The vessels flew the flags of Gabon or Panama.

## Trafigura Group
An investigation by Le Monde found that between February 2023 and February 2024, at least 41 cargoes of petroleum were sold by Coral to Trafigura Group. Coral and Trafigura have a close relationship and have shared employees. Otabek Karimov, a former executive at Rosneft, left the company in May 2022 and is believed to have played a key role in the development and management of Coral's trading operations. He was hired by Trafigura in Dubai in June. A Trafigura spokesperson stated the company "has complied and continues to comply with the Price Cap Framework, as well as all sanctions laws applicable to it."

## Coral Energy Today
2Rivers now reportedly employs 110 people, and sales were expected to total $11 billion in 2024. In the press release, Karimov insisted that 2Rivers was a new venture. However, the company's roots remain associated with Coral Energy: according to available information, just two weeks before the rebranding, Pura Vida, Coral's parent company, became the 85% shareholder of Novus Middle East, another company affiliated with Coral and said to be Garayev's holding company.

In July 2024, Nord Axis' Russian activity came to an abrupt halt. This is most likely a temporary inconvenience, as reports indicate that further companies linked to Eyyub, namely Voliton, Guron Trading, and Pontus Trading continue to keep the oil flowing out of Russia. 

## The Bottom Line
The emergence of new players in Russia's oil industry, such as Nord Axis and Coral Energy, has significantly altered the landscape of the country's energy sector. These companies, operating in the shadows and utilizing complex networks of shell companies and aging ships, have enabled Russia to maintain its grip on the global energy market despite Western sanctions. The rise of these opaque entities has introduced a new era of complexity and secrecy to Russia's oil industry, making it increasingly challenging to track the flow of oil and the parties involved. As international authorities continue to scrutinize these companies, it remains to be seen whether they will be able to evade sanctions and maintain their influence in the industry. The case of Etibar Eyyub, the architect behind Nord Axis, serves as a prime example of the adaptability of these new players, who are willing to go to great lengths to achieve their goals and avoid detection. As the global energy landscape continues to evolve, it is essential to shed light on the activities of these shadowy companies and to hold them accountable for their actions, to ensure the integrity of the global energy market and the effectiveness of sanctions enforcement. Ultimately, the true extent of Russia's oil exports and the identities of the companies and individuals behind the Shadow Fleet remain shrouded in mystery, highlighting the need for continued investigation and vigilance against sanctions evasion.

The complex network of opaque shell companies of the Shadow Fleet linked to Etibar Eyyub.

Limited Lifecycle: Russia's Oil Sanctions Evasion Network

Who is behind the shadowy company Nord Axis? He sits smoking Marlboro Lights in Dubai's Platinum Tower and rose from relative obscurity to orchestrating a billion-dollar sanctions-busting oil empire. The Azerbaijani-born trader in question is Etibar Eyyub, age 46. He started out as the right-hand man to the founder of Coral Energy (2Rivers), Tahir Garayev, the company that conveniently vacated the space that Nord Axis immediately occupied.

Eyyub reportedly told colleagues that his ambition was to make the Forbes billionaires list. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has presented him with the perfect circumstances to achieve this goal. His rapid ascent into the Russian oil market facilitated by a close relationship with Russian oligarch Igor Sechin. Eyyub and Sechin are said to have gone to the sauna and hunting together; Eyyub was one of the few close friends invited to attend the funeral of Sechin's son in St. Petersburg.

![](/uploads/Screenshot_from_2025_04_14_14_27_25_fc4d220c9f.png)

Eyyub, along with Garayev, operates a network of obscure companies to facilitate the export of Russian oil. These companies are registered in various locations, such as the UAE DMCC free zone and Hong Kong, making it difficult to track their activities.

Eyyub's work has been instrumental in helping Russia circumvent Western sanctions. He has been involved in the creation of complex webs of transactions and shell companies, allowing Coral Energy and its affiliates to continue exporting Russian oil despite sanctions.

Eyyub's activities have also been linked to other companies, such as Voliton, Guron Trading, and Pontus Trading, which continue to export Russian oil. His involvement in these companies has allowed him to maintain a low profile while still being a key player in the Russian oil industry.

To date, Eyyub has avoided direct sanctions despite his frequent travel to Moscow and close links to the Russian regime, but there are signs that justice may be starting to catch up with the Azeri opportunist. Information states that he was forced to abandon plans to build a luxury villa on the "hill of billionaires" in Cologny, as he is barred from transferring funds into Switzerland.

![Architect designs for Eyyub's planned villa](/uploads/Screenshot_from_2025_04_14_14_28_13_d99b86be59.png)

In July 2024, Nord Axis's Russian activity came to an abrupt halt. This is most likely a temporary inconvenience, as reports indicate that further companies linked to Eyyub, namely Voliton, Guron Trading, and Pontus Trading, continue to keep the oil flowing out of Russia. However, with an increasing spotlight being cast on his activities, his Forbes list ambitions may have to wait.

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Who is behind the sanctions-busting, shadowy company Nord Axis?

Etibar Eyyub: The Man Behind Nord Axis

In response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the international community swiftly imposed a range of economic sanctions aimed at restricting the Russian economy and limiting the country's ability to fund its military aggression. Among the most significant of these measures were sanctions targeting Russia's oil sector, a crucial component of the country's economy and a major source of revenue for the Russian government. In particular, the G7 group of nations, along with other EU countries, agreed on a price cap on the sale or purchase of Russian oil and petroleum products.

In an effort to avoid the price cap, and other possible sanctions, Russia has encouraged the creation of its own Shadow Fleet of limited lifecycle companies operating aging tankers, to hide the real trade in Russian oil. While some may be under direct if covert Russian control, many are owned and operated by opportunistic third-party operators, who can make large profits in trading Russian oil. To support this, an array of companies has sprung up to facilitate the trade, while also making it difficult to track activity, and therefore aid in evading sanctions.

The number of little-known trading firms relied on by Moscow to export large volumes of crude exports to Asia has mushroomed in recent months. Sanctions against Russian oil sparked major oil firms and commodity houses to withdraw from business with producers in Russia. As Western companies pulled out of Russian oil markets in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this shadowy network of shell companies immediately stepped in to fill the gap.

The Shadow Fleet network is a shift away from the small number of well-established major oil companies that have handled Russian oil products for decades. Shipping data indicates over 40 middlemen and companies with no prior involvement in the oil business, handled Russian oil trading between March and June 2024.

These new companies have quickly become some of the world's biggest oil traders, shipping at least half of Russia's crude oil and refined oil on average in 2024, up to 6-8 million barrels per day, appearing after Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

## Bellatrix Energy

Bellatrix Energy is a prime example of a murky Shadow Fleet company. Sharing a name with an evil witch from the Harry Potter world, this company is practicing evil of a much more banal form.

Bellatrix Energy is controlled by Bilal Aliyev, an Azerbaijani who took control in the early weeks of the Russian invasion. According to the US Government, since the middle of June 2023, vessels chartered by Bellatrix have made more than 150 port calls in Russia. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Bellatrix has traded tens of millions of tons of crude oil and other products of Russian state-owned companies, and has received a loan worth hundreds of millions of dollars from a Russian state-owned bank. Bellatrix has also borrowed from the Russian Regional Development Bank, which OFAC (US Office of Foreign Assets Control) designated for sanctions on November 2 2023.

One particular example, shows the sort of methodology used to obscure the trade in Russian oil from detection by concerned authorities. In May 2023, a Liberian-flagged tanker (but actually part of the Shadow Fleet), the 'Leopard I' left Ust-Luga port in Russia, carrying 100,000 tonnes of Russian oil bound for India. The company who had ostensibly brokered the shipment was Bellatrix Energy, but not for long. Halfway on the journey, while still at sea, the oil changed hands. The new owner was now Guron Trading, another Hong Kong based company, and one which has also been identified and sanctioned for its part in obfuscating the trade in Russian oil. The exchange was clearly not a genuine business transaction, just a sleight-of-hand to confuse things. This web of transactions, with ownership changing hands in mid-voyage etc, is typical of the way Russian oil is currently being laundered through a series of shell companies and nominal owners, making it increasingly difficult to track the true origin and destination of the oil, thereby allowing Russia to continue evading sanctions while deceiving the international community about the extent of its oil exports. Bellatrix is just one such dirty company, serving the same dirty function as many others.

### Guron Trading

Guron Trading, based in Hong Kong, now operates the Liberian-flagged 'Leopard I'. The company was founded 12/20/2021, the website was removed in 2024. It is now available and displays little information, just that the company deals in the international oil trade.

## Are the Sanctions Working?

Russia's oil exports fell in 2024 but revenue rose by $3.8 billion hitting $192 billion. Thanks to the Shadow Fleet, Russian oil exports from all sea ports reached a multi-year high in April and May 2024 at nearly 4 million bpd.

In May 2024, Russian oil supplies to India, which was a rare buyer of Russian oil before the invasion of Ukraine, hit a record of 1.95 million bpd while China imported 2.29 million bpd. China and India have become Russia's biggest buyers of oil since sanctions were introduced by Europe and the United States.

Of the largest oil producers, only Lukoil continues to market oil through its trading division, which it relocated to Dubai. The other companies sell to the new trading firms, which are mostly registered in China, Singapore, Hong Kong or Dubai.

According to data, from March to June 2024 the top oil traders who purchased oil from Rosneft, Surgutneftegaz and Gazprom Neft were, Dubai-based Petroruss, Hong Kong-registered Guron Trading, Bellatrix Energy and Covart Energy, Dubai-registered Voliton, Demex Trading, Nestor Trading, Orion Energy and Singapore-headquartered Patera.

Some companies, such as Voliton, had no websites or contact numbers.

These emerging companies have been instrumental in maintaining, and increasing Russia's oil exports by facilitating the redirection of shipments from major crude producers like Rosneft, Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz, and Gazprom Neft to countries such as India and China.

## The Bottom Line

The data reveals a disturbing methodology, where companies with limited lifecycles are deliberately established to circumvent sanctions and facilitate the trade of Russian oil. These opaque entities are strategically set up in jurisdictions with lenient regulatory environments, such as the UAE's DMCC free zone. By leveraging a complex web of intermediaries and proxy companies, the true ownership and beneficiaries of these organizations remain obscured, making it exceedingly difficult to track the origin and destination of oil products. This cleverly designed system enables sanctioned entities to covertly continue trading oil, reaping substantial profits in the process.

The transient nature of these companies, which can quickly be established and dissolved, adds an extra layer of complexity to the already murky landscape. This makes it challenging for authorities to monitor the transfer of oil products and assets, as exemplified by the transfer involving the 'Leopard I' vessel, between Bellatrix Energy and Guron Trading. The use of such shell companies, with their short lifecycles, has become a key tactic in evading sanctions, allowing Russia to maintain a steady flow of revenue from its oil exports.

Ultimately this methodology has significant implications for the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, as it enables Russia to continue funding its aggressive military campaign. The imposition of sanctions was intended to restrict Russia's ability to generate revenue from its oil sales, thereby limiting its capacity to finance its illegal war. However, by exploiting loopholes and using clandestine networks, Russia has been able to evade these sanctions, ensuring a continued influx of funds to support its illegal invasion of Ukraine. As a result, the international community must adapt its strategies to counter these evasion tactics, in order to effectively curb Russia's ability to profit from its oil exports and ultimately bring an end to the conflict in Ukraine.

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How Russia is using limited lifecycle companies to minimize the risk of oil sanctions.

Russia's Secret Strategy for Oil Sanctions Evasion

Despite Western sanctions Russia's illicit oil trade continues to thrive with the Shadow Fleet playing a crucial role in evading the price cap. Sanctions imposed in December 2022 by G7 countries on Russia's oil trade intend to prevent Russia from earning money to fund its illegal war in Ukraine however Western governments report that Russia is operating a dark fleet made up of hundreds of old tankers whose ownership is deliberately obfuscated.

The Kyiv School of Economics estimated that the Shadow Fleet comprises over 400 ships capable of transporting oil allowing Russia to evade the sanctions which cap the price of a barrel at $60, limiting Russia's ability to generate money. The aging tankers are bought by non-transparent entities in countries outside the G7 such as the Marshall Islands or the United Arab Emirates and sail under the flag of countries like the Cook Islands or Gabon. Despite being named 'Shadow Fleet' the ships overtly stop at Russian oil terminals, clearly displaying their activity. Some of the vessels can be linked to Russia as with the ships owned by Sovcomflot. The Shadow Fleet's ability to operate with relative impunity has significant implications for the effectiveness of Western sanctions.

## Sanctions
The cap on oil prices means that companies cannot buy oil priced above the threshold and insurers cannot provide cover for ships involved in these practices. By capping the price of oil, it can still be provided to countries but Russia cannot make large profits on it, avoiding a gasoline crisis that would increase prices globally. The UN International Maritime Organization requires ships to have insurance and audits to ensure their safety. The Kyiv School of Economics reports that before the sanctions most ships were insured by International Group but since the sanctions the number of ships transporting Russian oil and insured by IG has decreased by 60%. To evade this, non-transparent entities in countries that don't adhere to sanctions such as UAE, India, the Seychelles, buy old tankers and insure them through non-Western or Russian insurance companies.

Western countries have sanctioned 270 ships operating in the Shadow Fleet and 183 more vessels have been added to the sanctions list in the last month. It is reported that approximately two-thirds of the ships have become idle, unable to operate which is costing large amounts of money for the entity that owns it ultimately meaning less money for Russia to fund its illegal war.

## Environmental Damage
A tanker carrying over 300,000 barrels of oil from the port of Vysotsk nearly ran aground in the Danish Straits in 2023. Aged 18 years the vessel posed a significant environmental risk as its advanced age made it more susceptible to accidents, potentially leading to severe ecological damage had it run aground. The clean-up would be costly, and due to the sanctions surrounding insurance of these vessels, it is unknown whether the ship's cover would be able to finance the cost. Many European countries now request insurance details from suspected Shadow Fleet ships which can be added to sanctions lists if they do not have correct insurance.

The recent disaster involving Volgoneft 212 and Volgoneft 239 on December 16 2024 further highlights the danger of these aging ships. During a heavy storm Volgoneft 212 split in half and Volgoneft 239 ran aground causing oil to spill in the Kerch Strait, which could be one of the worst ecological disasters the region has seen in years. The ships are over 50 years old and it is clear that they are not maintained to safety standards. As a result, dead birds were filmed on the beaches nearby. Russia's continued operation of aging and damaged ships highlights the country's disregard for environmental protection. Russia's prioritization of oil profits to fund its ongoing conflict, is coming at the expense of both human well-being and the well-being of the environment. This raises questions about the long-term consequences of Russia's actions and the potential for devastating ecological damage.

By operating these aging, damaged ships, Russia continues to carelessly destroy the environment, thinking only about its oil profits to fund its illegal war and not about the well-being of people or the environment.

## Sabotage
On December 25 2024 an undersea power cable and 4 data cables were severed, disrupting the supply of electricity from Estonia to Finland. Finnish police seized an oil tanker registered in the Cook Islands suspected of being part of the Shadow Fleet. It is reported that Eagle S dragged its anchor along the seabed to damage the Estlink 2 cable that supplies electricity to Estonia from Finland. It was only just stopped by Finnish defense forces before it would have hit further critical connections.

The damage to the Estlink 2 cable is the second time vital undersea cables between NATO allies have been damaged in 2 months. In November China-flagged bulk carrier Yi Peng 3 dragged anchor to damage the C-Lion 1 communication cable connecting Finland and Germany. The ship spent over 4 weeks in international waters in the Danish Straits as officials investigated.

This has triggered the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a group of 10 European countries to launch an operation dubbed 'Northern Warden', to begin real-time monitoring and warning dissemination to JEF and NATO countries and allies about possible threats to ensure the safety of undersea infrastructure.

The Shadow Fleet's involvement in such activities underscores the need for increased vigilance and cooperation among Western countries to counter Russia's illicit activities. The Shadow Fleet's sabotage incidents have significant implications for the security of undersea infrastructure and highlights the need for a coordinated response to address these threats.

## Russia's Invasion of Ukraine
Despite the price cap, Kyiv School of Economics estimates that Russia earned an extra $9.4B throughout 2024. Sanctions experts say that the price Russia gets for its oil has increased, and the reduction it sees overall is now less than $10 per barrel, which has allowed Russia's oil profits to steadily increase.

In light of the political distractions and uncertainty in Western states' commitment to Ukraine, Russia will continue its campaign to bomb Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure into submission. Despite Russia's overall poor economic performance since the beginning of the invasion, the $9.4B generated illicitly over the course of one year significantly reduces the severity of its economic problems. Russia's ability to resource its illegal war in Ukraine, through grain theft, sanctions evasion and obfuscated oil transactions, will continue unabated unless further pressure is applied to the Shadow Fleet.


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Exposing Russia's tactics to evade oil sanctions and fund its illegal war in Ukraine.

In the Shadows: How Russia Evades Oil Sanctions

Over two and a half years into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine reports show that Russia is struggling to provide enough equipment to keep up with the losses suffered.

As Ukraine continues to target and successfully destroy Russian ammunition depots Russia continues to receive help from friendly countries to keep their stocks of ammunition high enough to meet the demands of the conflict. International sanctions have complicated this situation for Russia however they continue to find support in return for exporting technology and commodities to partners.

Let's take a look at some of the countries that have supported Russia's invasion of Ukraine, what they have provided, and how it aids their ability to strike military targets and civilian settlements in Ukraine.

## China
Beijing has been accused of selling military equipment to Russia including electronics and components used in military hardware in return for information on technological advancements. It is reported that 70% of the machine tools and 90% of the microelectronics Russia imports comes from China. Chinese companies have also been reported to provide non-lethal military aid such as protective gear and surveillance equipment which Russia could use for intelligence gathering. China's involvement raises questions about its commitment to comply with international sanctions.

## Iran
Iran has been one of the most significant suppliers of weapons to Russia providing drones including the Shahed-136 and Mohajer-6. These UAVs have been used to devastating effect against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure causing damage and loss of life. Reports also suggest that Iran may be supplying Russia with short-range ballistic missiles. Iran's support for Russia marks a significant escalation in their military relationship.

## North Korea
North Korea has a long history of cooperation with Russia and has been providing Moscow with artillery shells and rockets. North Korea's stockpiles of Soviet-era artillery shells are in demand from Russia. This partnership highlights the enduring relationship between North Korea and Russia and once again demonstrates the challenges of enforcing international sanctions.

## Belarus
Belarus has played a crucial role in Russia's war effort, providing logistical and material support to Russian forces. The country has allowed Russia to use its territory as a staging ground for attacks on Ukraine and has also provided repair facilities for Russian equipment damaged in the conflict. Belarus has also been involved in training exercises with Russia, these points suggest that Belarus is deeply invested in Russia's war effort.

## Conclusion
Russia's ability to bolster its military-industrial complex through strategic partnerships with key nations has proven instrumental and its impact is only going to grow in sustaining its war effort. The involvement of countries such as Iran, North Korea, and Belarus has significantly contributed to Russia's ability to circumvent international sanctions and maintain a steady supply chain. As the conflict in Ukraine persists it is evident that Russia will need to exploit all available channels to acquire the necessary resources to sustain its war effort. Whether it is able to achieve this may be the determining factor in the outcome of this protracted conflict.


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A look at some of the countries that have supported Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Supplying the War Machine:Countries Supplying Arms to Russia

Tensions are rising between Prigozhin, The Russian Ministry of Defense, and the Kremlin as small and strategically **'Insignificant'** gains are made on the eastern front.

### Tensions Build
Russian forces have been on the eastern front for over 8 months now and have only just taken their first apparent 'strategic' settlement of Soledar. But was it conventional Russian forces that 'succeeded'? Or was it the Private Military Company, Wagner, that took the settlement by attrition and numbers, sacrificing potentially up to 10,000 men for the settlement. NOTE - The capture of Soledar was not the primary objective on the eastern front. Bakhmut was and still is the primary objective for Russia. Soledar was meant to allow a partial encirclement of Bakhmut leading to its capture by Russian forces. This is not possible and will not happen due to: up to 10,000 Wagner mercenaries being killed rendering the next advance on Bakhmut almost impossible due to lack of numbers, and the main 'strategic' choke points have not been captured in the Soledar area, meaning Bakhmut is not and will not be encircled.

### What is Going On?
On January 12, the Russian MoD publicly praised the assault and army aviation, missile and artillery groups, and airborne VDV forces for capturing Soledar. There was no mention of Wagner. Until 6 hours later when another MoD statement was made recognizing Wagner volunteers and Assault Detachments for helping secure residential areas. This probably upset Prigozhin who now appears to be carrying out his own information operations on the Russian MoD, the Kremlin, and his President. It isn't just one way though. As the illegal yet conventional war continues in Ukraine, a modern social media vs. conventional media war is being waged in Russia and online. Prigozhin and Putin are at the heart of it.

## Recent Events of Prigozhin, Putin, and the MoD

### What Has Prigozhin Done Recently Then?
- Prigozhin seems to be using Soledar as a bargaining chip to elevate his authority in Russia. The MoD initially claimed conventional Russian forces victory, with no mention of Wagner. They then backtracked and acknowledged them - it appears as though the MoD are struggling to keep their messaging in order.
- Prigozhin played on questions put to him by journalists regarding his future meeting with Putin where he said he would look to discuss Wagner's success in taking Soledar. This undermines Gerasimov and Shoigu and the whole Russian MoD.
- Prigozhin personally visited Soledar in the days leading up to the seizure of the settlement, capitalizing on the media presence and taking photos of him with his Wagner mercenaries allegedly 'advancing'.
- He pre-empted the announcement by the Russian MoD on January 12 by accusing unnamed bureaucrats and government officials of "constantly trying to steal the victory from Wagner PMC". The MoD did indeed then claim full victory with no mention of Wagner forces.
- Milbloggers. both independent and Wagner affiliated churned out articles heavily criticizing the Russian MoD for its reporting and handling of the Soledar 'victory'. The Russian MoD being beaten by an illegal PMC at information warfare?
- Openly argued against the Russian MoD's latest Operational Security update regarding the new guidelines for Russian troops in Ukraine that restrict the use of smartphones and set strict guidelines for soldiers' beards. Prigozhin claimed that beards are customary for many Muslim and Orthodox Christian fighters and claimed that soldiers' use of smartphones was necessary in modern combat.
- Called out members of Putin's Presidential Administration on telegram on January 18 claiming some members are traitors for not wanting to ban YouTube as they want Russia to fail in Ukraine so that a dialogue can be opened with the US.

![Yevgeny Prigozhin](/uploads/Yevgeny_Prigozhin_f1c514d14c.png)

### Putin Reacts
- Ordered United Russia Part Central Executive Committee Head Alexander Sidyakin, United Russia State Duma parliamentarian Artyom Turovyi, and Donetsk People Republic Head Denis Pushilin met with multiple milbloggers on January 13. He's trying to gather support from his own milbloggers.
- On January 15, Putin publicly attributed the success on the Soledar frontline to the Russian MoD and General Staff. He did this using his favorit means of mass messaging, live television - the form of media that he relied on most throughout his early days in power. Maybe he doesn't know how to use Telegram, or Twitter (or he doesn't have a VPN?). This public acknowledgment is odd. He has never commented on small 'tactical' advances in Ukraine. Is he nervous that Prigozhin has a hold over the media? Is he trying to flex and regain control?
- Putin seems to be increasingly siding with Prigozhin's adversaries more often, likely in order to degrade Prigozhin's influence through Russia and amongst the Ground Forces oeprating illegally in Ukraine. On January 18, Putin met with St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov - an enemy of Prigozhin (ISW) - to discuss St. Petersburg's role in the war in Ukraine. NOTE - Prigozhin has previously launched a campaign petitioning for the removal of Beglov from his office for treason for failing to support the Russian war effort. Prigozhin-affiliated outlets published exposes on Beglov claiming he had deliberately impeded the advertising efforts for recruitment into the three St. Petersburg local battalions.
- He continues to double down on the official rhetoric that only conventional Russian forces captured Soledar, publicly rejecting Prigozhin's claims that Wagner played a part in the small 'tactical' victory.

![Yevgeny Prigozhin and Putin](/uploads/Yevgeny_Prigozhin_and_Putin_881a87028c.png)

### MoD Being Told What To Do? By Who?
- On January 15, alongside Putin's television address, the Russian MoD continued to report that VDV units were attacking Ukrainian positions with no mention of Wagner in the briefings.
- Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov noted in his January 16 briefing that the conflict is a "product of information manipulation" and that there manipulations may come from Russia's 'enemies', they may also be coming from the Kremlin's 'friends' - any need to beat around the bush? Just name Prigozhin. And what did Prigozhin have to say about this? Did he deny and assert that there was no bad blood between the Russian MoD and Wagner? No, he continued his tactic of providing vague messaging to create more unrest and increased discussion in the Russian information space. Interestingly, on January 15, he awarded a medal to a Wagner mercenary who had previously been given the medal of courage from Putin.

![Gerasimov and Shoigu](/uploads/Gerasimov_and_Shoigu_212fd8e077.png)

### So What Next?
Russia is waging an illegal war in Ukraine and an information war online. Can Putin and Prigozhin, the MoD and Wagner keep up on both fronts? The more this continues, the greater the tension builds, and then what? Does Prigozhin have enough support from his milbloggers, journalists, and Russian citizens to continue his information war online? The tensions of war appear to be enough to break up even the closest of friends. Who would have thought that a President and his former hot-dog vendor best friend could fall out.

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Tensions are rising between Prigozhin, The Russian Ministry of Defense, and the Kremlin as small and strategically 'Insignificant' gains are made on the eastern front.

Where is Russia Today?

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Rising Tensions

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Rising Tensions

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Rising Tensions

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Eyyub and Garayev Connected Companies

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Eyyub and Garayev's Oil Empire

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How Putin's Regime Continues Sanction Evasion

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Sanctions evasion in the heart of Europe

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The Network Grows

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Limited Lifecycle: Russia's Oil Sanctions Evasion Network

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Etibar Eyyub: The Man Behind Nord Axis

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Russia's Secret Strategy for Oil Sanctions Evasion

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In the Shadows: How Russia Evades Oil Sanctions

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Supplying the War Machine:Countries Supplying Arms to Russia

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