North Korean troops deployed to Russia’s Kursk region have encountered significant challenges, including severe casualties, poor conditions, and psychological strain. Sent under a military cooperation agreement, an estimated 10,000 to 12,000 soldiers arrived in mid-2024, reportedly under the command of Colonel General Kim Yong Bok, commander of the North Korean special forces. However, their involvement has been marred by logistical shortcomings, insufficient training, and fierce opposition from Ukrainian forces.  

![North Korean soldiers arriving at a Russian training camp](/uploads/Screenshot_from_2025_04_03_12_30_48_23779e2605.png)

### Heavy Casualties and Operational Struggles
By late 2024, reports indicated that over 3,000 North Korean troops had been killed or wounded. Many soldiers, unprepared for modern warfare, had no tactical awareness of how to counter the relentless Ukrainian drone attacks. The troops relied heavily on Russian artillery support, which proved unreliable at times, with reports of friendly fire incidents further exacerbating losses. North Korea has reportedly declined to repatriate the bodies of soldiers killed, this decision stems from concerns that returning the remains could provoke public anger and potentially lead to civil unrest within North Korea. 

In lieu of repatriation, North Korean authorities are issuing certificates of war to the families of deceased soldiers. However, the bodies are not being returned, and there are reports that North Korean officials are exploring methods, such as utilizing facilities that rapidly freeze and crush remains.

Captured soldiers, claiming to be from the 'Korean People’s Army Special Operations Force (KPASOF)' revealed that many had been deceived into believing they were attending military training abroad rather than deploying to active combat zones. Their lack of familiarity with drone warfare and modern tactics left them vulnerable, leading to devastating losses in the early stages of their deployment. Ukrainian assessments suggested that the surviving troops were temporarily withdrawn in January 2025, only to be hastily replenished and sent back to the front lines in February.  
![Captured North Korean soldier in Ukraine](/uploads/Screenshot_from_2025_04_03_12_24_15_b7e4890de4.png)

### Psychological and Ideological Strain
The psychological toll on North Korean soldiers has been immense. Accounts of suicides among troops to avoid capture have surfaced, driven by fears of severe punishment for their families back home. In North Korea, perceived military failure often results in harsh repercussions, further increasing soldiers' distress.  

Embedded Ministry of State Security agents closely monitored troops, enforcing ideological discipline and preventing dissent. Soldiers were subjected to strict surveillance, with even minor acts of defiance met with severe punishment. Misinformation campaigns were also prevalent, with agents claiming that Ukrainian drones were being operated by South Koreans to stoke nationalist fervor and reduce sympathy for the enemy.  

### Strategic Gains for North Korea 
While the human cost of North Korea's involvement in Russia's war in Ukraine has been significant, the regime stands to gain from the combat experience it's troops are acquiring. Military analysts suggest that the surviving officers and soldiers will return with valuable firsthand knowledge of modern warfare. This experience includes exposure to advanced combat tactics, drone operations, electronic warfare and complex front line logistics — areas in which North Korea has traditionally lagged behind more technologically advanced militaries.

The insights gained from the battlefield will likely be carefully studied and incorporated into North Korea’s military doctrine. Observers anticipate that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) may adapt its training programs to emphasize counter-drone measures and the effective use of unmanned aerial systems. Additionally, the experience of operating alongside Russian forces and observing the tactical successes and failures of modern mechanized warfare will provide Pyongyang with critical lessons on large-scale combat operations.

Furthermore, North Korea's military-industrial complex may benefit from exposure to Russian weapons systems and battlefield tactics. Analysts suggest that knowledge gained from the war could accelerate the development of indigenous weapons and technological adaptations, particularly in the fields of electronic warfare and air defense. These advancements may also influence North Korea's asymmetric warfare strategies, as the regime has historically relied on unconventional tactics to offset technological inferiority.

In the long term, this combat experience could strengthen North Korea’s regional military posture, particularly along its heavily fortified border with South Korea. Enhanced training methods, improved battlefield coordination, and refined logistical systems may make the KPA a more formidable force. Additionally, the perceived success of its military personnel abroad may serve as valuable propaganda, reinforcing domestic narratives of North Korean military strength.

Access to captured Western military equipment would be a significant opportunity for North Korea, offering a rare chance to study and reverse-engineer advanced weaponry, vehicles, communication systems, and other military hardware. By analyzing these technologies, North Korea could accelerate the development of its own defense systems, enhance missile guidance and electronic warfare capabilities, and improve the durability and effectiveness of its military assets. Additionally, insights gained from Western systems could inform countermeasures against such technologies, bolstering North Korea’s asymmetric warfare strategies. This access would not only modernize its military but also strengthen its geopolitical influence, particularly if Pyongyang shares its findings with other adversarial states.

![US gifted Main Battle Tank captured by Russia](/uploads/Screenshot_from_2025_04_03_12_31_08_a316c780b0.png)

### Strengthening Relationship
On March 22, 2025, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu traveled to Pyongyang for a high-level meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. This diplomatic engagement signals the continuation of North Korea’s support for Russia amid the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. It is widely speculated that the meeting will not only reinforce the current supply of ammunition and personnel but may also signal an expansion of North Korea's involvement in the conflict. Given the strategic importance of both Russia and North Korea’s evolving military cooperation, the meeting likely paves the way for deeper integration in their bilateral military efforts, with potential increases in arms shipments, military training, and logistical support. This development underscores the increasingly complex geopolitical dynamics in the region and highlights the deepening military alliance between the two nations.

As the conflict in Ukraine continues, the future of North Korean troops in Kursk remains uncertain. However, their experiences offer a stark insight into the cost of military alliances and the human toll of being Russia's ally.

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The costs and advantages for North Korea by deploying soldiers to help Russia in Kursk.

North Korean Troops in Kursk: The cost of supporting Russia 

Russia's dependence on North Korea is an illustration of desperation and failure in its military endeavors. Despite its boasts of military power, Russia's reliance on North Korea for ammunition and troops is a clear indication of its own military shortcomings and has exposed significant vulnerabilities in Russia's military. The fact that Russia has been forced to turn to a country with a relatively underdeveloped military like North Korea highlights the extent of its own capabilities' decline. This partnership may not be a game-changer for Russia, as Russia hoped, but rather a reflection of its own weakness. Ultimately, the developing Russia-North Korea partnership is a symptom of a larger problem - Russia's inability to achieve its military objectives through its own strength. As the conflict in Ukraine continues to drag on, it remains to be seen how long Russia can sustain its military efforts without a significant overhaul of its military strategy and capabilities.

## The Alliance
The Russia-North Korea relationship has been years in the making. Initially Russia's offers to North Korea were limited to economic assistance and diplomatic support. However, as the years passed, their economic ties have deepened, and Russia has become one of North Korea's primary trading partners. The 2010s saw a significant expansion of their cooperation, with joint ventures and diplomatic exchanges becoming increasingly common.

Today through collaborative efforts, Russia and North Korea are able to provide each other with vital support addressing critical needs that bolster their respective global standings. Russia benefits from North Korea's help in alleviating ammunition shortages, while North Korea gains access to advanced technology, allowing both nations to strengthen their positions on the world stage.

## Munitions
Driven by Russia's military struggles in Ukraine, North Korea has reportedly supplied Russia with at least 2.8 million artillery shells, and ballistic missiles to help alleviate its ammunition shortages. Reportedly half of Russia's shells used in Ukraine are from North Korea.

Dozens of ballistic missiles have also been supplied to Russia to damage and destroy cities in Ukraine, however there have been concerns about the quality of the ammunition. Approximately half of the North Korean missiles fired by Russia have malfunctioned and exploded mid-air, questioning their reliability.

In return, Russia has provided North Korea with resources such as food and energy, and has reportedly provided technologies for nuclear weapons and submarine missile launch systems which has supported North Korea in evading sanctions.

## Troop Deployment
There are reports that North Korea has deployed close to 11,000 troops to support Russian forces, however North Korea denied these reports despite proof of troops fighting near Sudzha.

## Troop Effectiveness
There are concerns regarding the effectiveness of North Korean troops and reports question the quality of training received by these soldiers. An ex North Korean soldier who defected to the United States warned that the troops would not be ready for battle due to a lack of training, and highlighted that North Korea had never fought in a major conflict.

Coming from an isolated nation, North Korean soldiers will face significant challenges in Ukraine due to their limited familiarity with the country and its terrain. Their military training has primarily taken place in the mountainous regions of North Korea, leaving them unprepared for the vastly different landscape of Ukraine's flat and expansive battlefields.

According to reports, North Korean soldiers in Russia have been equipped with advanced technology including night-vision goggles, thermal-imaging devices and illuminated gun sights. However, this may create challenges for the troops, as they are not accustomed to training with such equipment in North Korea. Additionally, they are fighting in a war where the use of drones is prevalent, which is another unfamiliar technology that may require significant adjustment.

Growing up in a country with limited food availability may potentially leave North Korean soldiers vulnerable to malnutrition. And the lack of mixing with other countries mean they may be vulnerable to illness as they come into contact with new people. South Korean researchers found that defectors from North Korea have higher rates of hepatitis B and C, tuberculosis and parasites.

Furthermore, language barriers have reportedly hindered communication between North Korean soldiers and their Russian counterparts, potentially compromising training and joint military operations. This communication gap may pose significant challenges on the battlefield where clear and effective communication is critical.

## Conclusion
Russia has repeatedly relied on undertrained personnel, 'cannon fodder', to compensate for its military's skill and training deficiencies since the onset of the conflict. The Russian military has faced significant challenges in training its own personnel, which raises concerns about its capacity to provide adequate training to North Korean troops. Given these limitations, it is unlikely that Russia will be able to train North Korean forces to a satisfactory level of proficiency. It is likely that Russia is seeking to augment its numbers with troops from North Korea, who would be used to supplement its existing forces and mitigate losses incurred in Ukraine. This decision may be intended to enable Russia to continue its high-risk, high-casualty assaults, where the primary objective is to overwhelm enemy positions through sheer numbers rather than tactical finesse.

North Korea's pursuit of resources and partnerships has driven them to Russia, but this collaboration may come with a cost. Russia will likely use North Korean soldiers for their assaults as they did previously with Wagner and convicts, which would leave North Korea to bear the brunt of casualties. This would raise questions about the true benefits of this alliance for North Korea, as their military personnel would likely be put in serious harm's way.

Meanwhile, Russia's desperation for additional manpower has led them to seek out a partnership with a problematic ally, highlights the weaknesses in their position in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. This move suggests that Russia's military strength and international standing may be more tenuous than it appears, as they resort to collaboration with a regime like North Korea, in order to bolster their illegal invasion of Ukraine. Avoiding depletion of their military capability beyond recoverable levels will be of key importance to Russia as the conflict progresses.

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Discussing Russia's reliance on North Korea for its illegal invasion of Ukraine. 

North Korean Troops: From Pyongyang to the Front Line

It's been 6 months since Russian forces embarked on their offensive for Bakhmut. 6 months and they are yet to take the city. 6 months and they have resorted to replacing the dead with more Wagner mercenaries, more mass-mobilized conscripts, and more prisoners. Is this poorly managed offensive really worth it? Or do the Russian seniors continue to throw men towards this apparent 'strategic' location in order to maintain some form of face after their embarrassing retreats from Kharkiv and Kherson?

## What Has Happened So Far?
A key Russian goal of the illegal 'Special Military Operation' was to capture the Donbas region, firmly controlling Luhansk and Donetsk. The early battles for Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk were successful for the Russian forces, resulting in the full control of Luhansk Oblast. The focus then shifted towards the cities of Sloviansk, Soledar, and Bakhmut - all located on strategic supply lines between Donetsk and Luhansk. In mid-August, Ukrainian Brigadier General Tarnavskiy assessed that Russia had a 5-to-1 manpower advantage over the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the Eastern Axis. **NOTE - As of January 12, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are still here.**

### August
The Russian Armed Forces launched their main ground attack on the settlements to the south and southeast of Bakhmut. Airstrikes and shelling of the largely civilian occupied city significantly increased until August 4 when Wagner mercenaries pushed through Ukrainian defenses only to reach Patrice Lumumba street on the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.

Russian forces continued their kinetic shelling of Bakhmut resulting in the deaths of 7 civilians and injuring 6 more. Infrastructure was flattened and the Russian forces pushed towards Bakhmut from the south. The Ukrainian general staff assessed that as of August 14 Russian forces had achieved 'partial success' near Bakhmut. **NOTE - This was 6 months ago and Ukrainian forces are still here.**

Wagner forces were heavily bolstered by prisoners recruited from multiple Russian penal facilities. https://twitter.com/WhereisRussia/status/1592172255081013250

![Ukraine/Russia Conflict Map 0908.png](/uploads/0908_6dad6dd49c.png)

### October
October 7, Russian forces furthered their advancement into the settlements of Zaitseve and Opytne to the south and southeast of Bakhmut although these villages and some factories were fiercely contested by Ukrainian Armed Forces.

![Ukraine/Russia Conflict Map 1007.png](/uploads/1007_517107168b.png)

### November
On November 10, Ukrainian Armed Forces reported that the Russian Wagner Group suffered almost 140 casualties in just 24 hours and that the fighting in and around Bakhmut had descended into trench warfare in which both sides continue to attack, counter, and dig in until one prevails.

November 28, Russian forces finally broke through the Ukrainian defensive lines south of Bakhmut where they advanced through Optyne, but still made minimal and slow gains, only capturing settlements of Andriivka, Ozarianivka, and Zelenopillia.

### December
Serhii Cherevatyi, a spokesperson for Ukraine's Eastern Command stated on December 3 that the Bakhmut front was "the most bloody, cruel and brutal sector in the Russian-Ukrainian war so far". He claimed that the Russian Armed Forces had "conducted 261 attacks with artillery of various calibers in the past 24 hours alone". **NOTE - Ukrainian forces are still there, and still defending against this brutality.**

December 9, Russian forces continued to probe at peripheral settlements to Bakhmut. Ukrainian forces successfully repelled attacks near Klishchiivka and Druzhba as Russian shelling continued.  One Ukrainian serviceman stated that remaining civilians, likely just surviving in basements, are not anti-Russian. Russian narratives continue to claim the Special Military Operation is to 'liberate', why then does Russia continue its war of attrition on people it considers its 'own'?

December 13, Russian sources claimed that urban street fighting had begun in the eastern and southeastern areas of Bakhmut. The Ukrainian forces successfully countered the Russian advances and pushed Wagner forces back to the eastern outskirts of the Fyodor Maksimenko area on 18 December. At this time, the Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force were reportedly repelling 5-7 advancing Russian units around Bakhmut per day and claimed to have an abundance of drones for surveillance allowing rapid responses to these Russian patrols on the outskirts and in the eastern industrial zone in particular.

Zelenskyy visited the Bakhmut front on 20/21 December while the shelling and bombardment continued on the outskirts. Wagner mercenaries continued to probe at Bakhmutske, Pidhorodne and Klishciivka on the northeastern and southwestern flanks of Bakhmut while the Ukrainian Armed Forces valiantly held the area to the north of Optyne, halting any southern Russian advances. On 26 December, the governor of Donetsk, Pavlo Kyrylenko, assessed that over 60% of Bakhmut's infrastructure was destroyed.

The Institute for the Study of War determined that Russia's advance on Bakhmut had 'culminated' by 28 December, assessing that Russian Armed Forces, and Wagner mercenaries, were unable to continue their assaults/shelling of Bakhmut at the scale they had been operating at over the last number of months.

![Ukraine/Russia Conflict Map 1209.png](/uploads/1209_939d180ddf.png)

### January
In early January, the Kyiv Independent stated that "The Battle of Bakhmut is likely culminating" with Ukraine successfully defending against illegal annexation. #BakhmutHolds.

## Why Continue in Bakhmut?
"It's about the money" said retired Ukrainian colonel, Serhiy Grabskiy, now a military analyst in Kyiv. The Wagner Group were assigned the task of capturing Bakhmut for the Kremlin, and in doing so will likely receive a substantial financial reward, perhaps a share of profits from the salt and gypsum mines if they ever succeed in taking them? Something that Yevgeniy Prigozhin would not be able to overlook, regardless of the significant number of Russian lives lost in doing so. Is financial gain worth that many Russian lives?

![Bakhmut Infrastructure.png](/uploads/Bakhmut_Infrastructure_7bf0c6fc88.png)

Grabskiy concludes that "the only part of the long front where Russia appears to have the capacity to go on the offensive is around Bakhmut, and it's important for the military to provide a battlefield success for Putin". The mass surrender of territory in Kharkiv and the complete withdrawal from Kherson has meant that Bakhmut is the only potential target the Kremlin would deem successful if ever it became occupied by Russian forces. Bakhmut's strategic importance is exaggerated by failures elsewhere in Ukraine.

Countless Russian lives lost in pursuit of a target that has become more strategic as the war develops. Time will tell to see if the Russian seniors, 'safe' in the Kremlin, 800km away, will continue to send their men to their slaughter for this city.

Meanwhile. Bakhmut Holds.

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Bakhmut Aerial Craters

800km away, the Kremlin continues to send men to their slaughter for the city of Bakhmut.

The Battle For Bakhmut

The 1st Guards Tank Army (1GTA) is a tank army of the Russian Ground Forces and part of the Western Military District. It was originally formed within the Soviet Red Army as the 1st Mechanized Army in June 1940, and served during the German-Soviet War at the Battle of Moscow and the Battle of Kursk. It was disbanded in 1998 after being reduced in strength, but reformed in 2014 with new units added and expanded to become an army once again.

The army is considered to be amongst the **ELITE** of the Russian Ground Forces and is comprised of the 2nd Motorized Division (Tamanskaya) and the 4th Tank Division (Kantemirovskaya) which are considered to be **ELITE** divisions consisting of **ELITE** regiments. They are garrisoned closest to Moscow and are considered highly prestigious postings, allocated for the defense of Moscow, and to be tasked with leading counter-attacks against NATO if that scenario should ever arise. The regiments and units within the divisions are given the most up-to-date state of the art software and tech and are known as the 'household' divisions of the Russian Army. The latest T-14 'Armata' 5th-generation tanks were to be supplied to the 1GTA with 100 being allegedly procured in 2016 and delivered by 2020. These are yet to be seen on the battlefield with the program being fully halted until 2025, although they do look good driving down the streets of Moscow in parades.

![Russian T-14](/uploads/T_14_d363dee8e3.png)

In 2015, Zvezda wrote a piece about the 1GTA titled the 'New Russian Divisions Are The Hammer That Will Break Any Defense'. Hammers are normally made of steel but the 1GTA appear to have been made of glass, shiny and brilliant on the surface, a Russian military facade. Should the 1GTA be renamed to 'Potemkin's Hammer Army'?

At the start of the invasion in February 2022, the 1GTA took part in the northeastern Ukraine offensive with the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division taking part in the failed siege of Chernihiv. After just 3 weeks in Ukraine, the 1GTA had lost 409 men and 308 units of military equipment.

![Destroyed Russian Tank](/uploads/Destroyed_tank_64573a95a1.png)

On May 19 2022 the 1GTA army commander General-Lieutenant Sergey Kisel was suspended for his failure to capture Kharkiv. Then, on September 13 2022, the 1GTA were identified as being the primary Russian force that retreated from Kharkiv Oblast as a result of the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive. The 1GTA are now considered to be severely degraded and would likely be unable to counter further Ukrainian counteroffensives.

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North Korean Troops: From Pyongyang to the Front Line

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The Battle For Bakhmut

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