Partners in Crime: Russian and Chinese cooperation in drone production and sanction evasion.

The fact that Russia uses third party sellers to avoid sanctions in order to acquire drones is not a new phenomenon, however, one of the most pertinent examples in this area is the rapid rise of Aero-HIT, a previously obscure Russian drone manufacturer headquartered in Khabarovsk, near the Chinese border.

Since late 2022, Aero-HIT has evolved into a key supplier of tactical drones for Russian forces operating in occupied Ukrainian territories, including the Kherson region. The company has secured Russian state funding and has ambitious plans to produce up to 10,000 drones per month in 2025, including more sophisticated variants beyond its current FPV offerings.

Aero-HIT’s operational success is tightly linked to covert and semi-covert cooperation with Chinese companies, despite official denials from Beijing. AeroHIT’s name is actually derived from the word ‘Aero’ and HIT from the prestigious Harbin Institute of Technology, in China —an academic institution sanctioned by the U.S. for its ties to China's defense sector.

Evidence reviewed from corporate memos, procurement correspondence, and government letters indicates that Aero-HIT has partnered extensively with entities such as Autel Robotics, a leading Chinese drone manufacturer, and Shenzhen Huasheng Industry Co. Ltd. Since early 2023, Aero-HIT has engaged Autel engineers to facilitate the potential localization of the Autel EVO Max 4T, a civilian drone with strong electronic warfare resistance features. The aim is to fully domesticate production of this platform within Russia.

Also key to Aero-HIT’s product line is the Veles, a First-Person View (FPV) drone which has been deployed extensively by Russian forces in Ukraine. The Veles drone has been cited in both combat operations and alleged attacks on civilians. Drones like the Veles have become a signature feature of modern warfare on the Eastern front, allowing for cheap, scalable battlefield surveillance and strike capabilities.

The procurement strategy employed by Aero-HIT and its partners illustrates a clear pattern of sanctions evasion. Rather than engaging in direct defense-sector trade, Russian entities utilize front companies in unrelated sectors, such as airline catering, seafood transport, and agriculture, as procurement intermediaries. These entities operate under seemingly innocuous commercial designations while funneling critical drone parts into the Russian military-industrial base. This method enables Russia to obfuscate the origin and destination of dual-use technologies while bypassing Western export controls.

The scale of this operation has not gone unnoticed by Western governments. The United States and United Kingdom have sanctioned Aero-HIT and its Chinese partners, accusing them of supplying drones or components to the Russian military. These sanctions have been met with denials from the involved Chinese firms, which maintain that they ceased all Russia-related business as of February 2022. However, the documented evidence suggests a more complex reality, with Chinese-origin technologies reaching Russia through third-party networks or unofficial relationships.

Within Russia, Aero-HIT enjoys direct links to state institutions and prominent political actors. The company is controlled by Komax, a firm owned by Konstantin Basyuk, a former KGB officer and current senator for Russian-occupied Kherson. The Russian Ministry of Defense appears to be a key client, with documented orders for thousands of drones and associated equipment. Internal memos also indicate that Aero-HIT has received political backing at the highest levels, including recognition as a priority project by Putin’s envoy to the Russian Far East.

This procurement pipeline was reinforced during a high-level visit to China in May 2023, during which a Russian delegation met with officials from the Harbin Comprehensive Bonded Zone and the Harbin Institute of Technology. The visit laid the groundwork for a joint venture in Khabarovsk, with plans to import drone kits, establish a customs-free production hub, and integrate Chinese components into Russian drone production. Although official Chinese export restrictions tightened in late 2023, the Khabarovsk production line was already operational, producing 200–300 drones per month and scaling up quickly.

Even after regulatory tightening in China, the Russian side adapted by leveraging lesser-known Chinese firms like Shenzhen Huasheng Industry, which signed a contract with Aero-HIT after other partners pulled out. These arrangements, while fragile, illustrate Russia’s determination to maintain access to Chinese technology. According to recent reports, components continue to be funneled into Russia via intermediaries such as Renovatsio-Invest, a firm sanctioned by the U.S. in 2024 for acting as a procurement agent for Aero-HIT.

In March 2024, operational documents indicate that 20 drones and batteries were delivered to a battalion in Kherson using a company specializing in seafood and logistics—a clear example of dual-use front company tactics. Further documentation shows the Russian Defense Ministry planning to purchase 5,000 Veles drones, antennas, and related hardware, though it remains unclear whether this transaction was completed. Separately, other units, such as the 76th Guards Air Assault Division based in Pskov, sought to procure drones from Aero-HIT via Aeromar-DV, a firm known primarily for airline catering services.

These cases highlight the persistent challenge of tracking and interdicting the gray-market networks that fuel Russia’s war machine. DJI drones and the Veles project with its supporting logistics are good examples of how Russia is capitalizing on its relationship with China and repurposing civilian technology for military applications, despite sanctions, export controls, and international condemnation.