Data released on the numbers of missiles used by Russia during it's invasion of Ukraine along with data on those remaining, points towards an upcoming critical shortage that is likely to limit any Russian plans for any future offensive, and this could lead to Russia losing more territory to a Ukrainian forces.

In November, Ukraine's Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov released data on Russian stocks of precision weapons and the amounts used during the first 9 months of the war. Calculating a monthly rate of expenditure from this data shows that Russia is likely to run out of its most high-precision weapons by Spring 2023 which will severely impact the chance of success of any Russian Spring offensive; this will mean that they will struggle to hold on to captured territory.

Below is a table which shows the data released and the calculated consumption rates and forecast expenditure of each munition:

|Missile|Stock|Produced|Expended|Remaining|Monthly Rate|Months Left|Forecast Usage of All Stock|
|-------|-------|----------|----------|------------|--------------|--------------|------------------------------|
|Iskander|	900	|48		|829	|	119		|92		|1.3		|December 2022|
|3M-55 Onyx	|470	|-		|123	|	347		|14		|24.8		|December 2024|
|S-300	|	8000	|-		|1020		|6980	|	113	|	61.8	|	January 2028|
|Kalibr	|	500	|120|		391		|229|		43	|	5.3		|April 2023|
|Kh-101		|144	|120	|	132	|	132	|	15	|	9	|	August 2023|
|Kh-555		|300	|-		|150	|	150	|	17	|	9	|	August 2023|
|Kh-22/32	|370|	-	|	250	|	120	|	28	|	4.3	|	March 2023|
|Kh-35	|	500	|360	|	504	|	356	|	56	|	6.4	|	May 2023|
|Kh-47M2 Kinzhal	|43	|16		|16		|43	|	2	|	21.5	|	September 2024|


The above figures are approximations and are calculated assuming that expenditure continues at the same rate as that seen during the first 9 months of the war. Rationing the use of ammunition would obviously extend the duration that remaining stocks will last for, this in itself will impact the ability of the Russians to effectively support their armed forces and would likely increase the attrition of troops and equipment as they suffer due to inadequate fire support.

![Russian missile arsenal](/uploads/Russian_missile_arsenal_60b68b2bc5.png)

Another sign that Russia's stock of precision missiles is running dangerously low is the repurposing of air defense and anti ship missiles into a ground attack role. These systems are ill-suited for use against ground targets, lacking the firepower and accuracy. The only real utility of repurposed weapons is for indiscriminate strikes against population centers, or for use as decoys when used alongside precision munitions; but crucially they will be of limited use against mobile military targets when trying to capture or defend territory.

![Clearly not a military target](/uploads/Clearly_not_a_military_target_0a8d4e5786.png)

Sources reported in late November that Russia was utilizing ageing cruise missiles stripped of their nuclear warheads also drawing the conclusion that stocks of conventional missiles were depleted.  It was suspected that the nuclear warheads of the AS-15 Kent air-launched cruise missiles had been replaced with ballast.  This again highlights the desperation of the Russian armed forces with the statement saying that “Although such an inert system will still produce some damage through the missile’s kinetic energy and any unspent fuel, it is unlikely to achieve reliable effects against intended targets". The less advanced these missiles are, the more the circular error probable (CEP) increases, meaning the less precise they become. Overall this will likely lead to more un-specific targets being struck by Russian kinetic strikes in the future as stocks wither away throughout the winter.

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thumbnail_Russian Iskander.png

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Russia's missile stock continues to decline at a rapid rate.

The Decline of Russia's Missile Stock

The 1st Guards Tank Army (1GTA) is a tank army of the Russian Ground Forces and part of the Western Military District. It was originally formed within the Soviet Red Army as the 1st Mechanized Army in June 1940, and served during the German-Soviet War at the Battle of Moscow and the Battle of Kursk. It was disbanded in 1998 after being reduced in strength, but reformed in 2014 with new units added and expanded to become an army once again.

The army is considered to be amongst the **ELITE** of the Russian Ground Forces and is comprised of the 2nd Motorized Division (Tamanskaya) and the 4th Tank Division (Kantemirovskaya) which are considered to be **ELITE** divisions consisting of **ELITE** regiments. They are garrisoned closest to Moscow and are considered highly prestigious postings, allocated for the defense of Moscow, and to be tasked with leading counter-attacks against NATO if that scenario should ever arise. The regiments and units within the divisions are given the most up-to-date state of the art software and tech and are known as the 'household' divisions of the Russian Army. The latest T-14 'Armata' 5th-generation tanks were to be supplied to the 1GTA with 100 being allegedly procured in 2016 and delivered by 2020. These are yet to be seen on the battlefield with the program being fully halted until 2025, although they do look good driving down the streets of Moscow in parades.

![Russian T-14](/uploads/T_14_d363dee8e3.png)

In 2015, Zvezda wrote a piece about the 1GTA titled the 'New Russian Divisions Are The Hammer That Will Break Any Defense'. Hammers are normally made of steel but the 1GTA appear to have been made of glass, shiny and brilliant on the surface, a Russian military facade. Should the 1GTA be renamed to 'Potemkin's Hammer Army'?

At the start of the invasion in February 2022, the 1GTA took part in the northeastern Ukraine offensive with the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division taking part in the failed siege of Chernihiv. After just 3 weeks in Ukraine, the 1GTA had lost 409 men and 308 units of military equipment.

![Destroyed Russian Tank](/uploads/Destroyed_tank_64573a95a1.png)

On May 19 2022 the 1GTA army commander General-Lieutenant Sergey Kisel was suspended for his failure to capture Kharkiv. Then, on September 13 2022, the 1GTA were identified as being the primary Russian force that retreated from Kharkiv Oblast as a result of the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive. The 1GTA are now considered to be severely degraded and would likely be unable to counter further Ukrainian counteroffensives.

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